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Abstract
A sustainable fiscal state needs to have two critical factors: A stable tax base and ac-
cess to an efficient bond market. The Tokugawa Shogunate had a stable land tax revenue,
which was inherited to modern Japan after the Meiji restoration. Taxation, however, was
restricted by the constitution after the Meiji restoration. The parliament opposed to ex-
pansionary policy in the early 1890s, and then it turned to support that at the exchange of
governmental commitment to investment in social infrastructure. The government commit-
ted to investment to increase productivity, and was allowed to raise tax rate. About the bond
market, at the other hand, the government had issued bonds only in the domestic market
until the mid 1890s. In the late 1890s, after Japan joined the international gold standard,
the government began to issue considerable amount of bonds, and the balance surged dur-
ing the Russo-Japanese war in 1904-1905. Now the London market efficiently financed
Japanese government. In the early 20th century, the government was one and only one
player that had established its own reputation in the international financial market. Hence
balance of Japanese government bonds was the only route to import capital. This route
also provided Japanese economy with macroeconomic stability, offsetting short-term cur-
rent account deficit by import of capital. Japan had finally been equipped with necessary
instruments as a stable and sustainable fiscal state.
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Introduction
Tokugawa Japan had relatively stronghold of stable tax basis, as a feudalist country, and this
was an important legacy for the New Imperial Government after the Meiji Restoration in 1868.
The New Imperial government, after taking over the early modern tax basis, formed the modern
domestic bond market first, and then went into the London market, to settle the fiscal system in
the financial market so that it could be efficiently financed. To understand this process of rise of
the Japanese fiscal state, it would be helpful to inquire three aspects.
The first one is process of centralizing taxation and stabilizing tax revenue. A nationwide tax
and land reform by Hideyoshi Toyotomi, who was the ruling samurai then, was the landmark
of simplification and centralization of taxation in feudalist Japan. By this reform, the central
government and feudalist states (hans) acquired strong tax control. The tax payment ratio in
agricultural crop reached as high as 40 percent. This regime was inherited to the Tokugawa
Shogunate. This was the historical origin of feudalist Japan, where fiscal stability was high as
a feudalist country. This legacy of strong taxation scheme was took over by the New Imperial
Government after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The New Imperial Government conducted a
big tax and land reform again, by which autonomy of feudal states was removed and all tax
revenue of the country came under control of the central government.
The second one is the big change of political environment after Japan developed into a
constitutional state in 1890, which meant the taxation and expenditure had to be approved by
the parliament. In the process of modernization and Westernization, people had grown up as
“citizens” who thought they had the right to control taxation and expenditure. The New Imperial
Government had no other option than to change into a constitutional state in order to justify
their rule. In the early 1890s, right after the constitution became effective and the parliament
was called first, the parliament was a battle field where the majority of representatives strongly
asserted the tax cut and the administration, which was not elected from representatives in the
period and sought expansion of military expenditure. However, in the late 1890s, they moved
to the other equilibrium where the parliament agreed to tax increase and the administration
increased expenditure for civil capital formation, not only for military. Stable tax revenue and
public capital formation became the rule of fiscal policy since then.
The third one is the government’s access to the bond market. While some feudalist states
issued bonds and notes which were permitted to circulate only within the issuer state in Toku-
gawa Japan, the Tokugawa Shogunate, the central government, did not issue bonds, so that the
Shogunate capital Edo (later Tokyo) and Osaka, the two biggest cities ruled by the Shogunate,
did not have any secondary bond market. The role of capital market in fiscal policy was neg-
ligible in Tokugawa Japan. The New Imperial Government began to issue government bonds
right after the Meiji Restoration, which was the historical origin of the modern capital market in
Japan. However, because the New Imperial Government considered the risk of being colonized
by Western powers, it had hesitated to issue government bonds in international markets until
the late 1890s. The circumstances gradually changed in the mid 1890s. Leaving from the silver
standard and joining the gold standard in 1897 decreased Japan’s country risk that led to smaller
country premium rate required when to issue government bonds. A big turning point came in
1904-1905 when Japan was in a war against Russia. Japanese government finally decided to
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issue huge amount of Japanese Government Bonds at the London market, endorsed by British
merchant banks, to afford the Russo-Japanese war. Both of this issue and the war were success-
ful, and then connection to the international capital market became an important instrument both
for fiscal stability and for macroeconomic stability. Issuing bonds in the international market
could decrease “crowding out” effect in the small domestic capital market, so that the govern-
ment had a more flexible arm to raise funds. Also, import of capital when the current account
deficit increased enabled the Bank of Japan, the central bank, to take a more moderate finan-
cial policy. Otherwise the Bank of Japan should have increased interest rate suddenly to keep
the parity of Japanese yen against the starling pound any time current account deficit surged.
In the 1900s, when Japanese private companies had not yet established their own reputation
in the international financial market, Japanese Government Bond was the dominant channel to
import capital. Thus fiscal policy gave the macroeconomic stability to Japanese economy, and
the macroeconomic stability in turn provided the government with stable tax revenue.
In the phase where Japan developed to a modern “fiscal state,” therefore, the well-functioning
international financial market centered at London took a critical role. However, at the same
time, if the government had made a mistake about when to enter the international market, Japan
could have faced with the risk to be colonized. After establishing a constitutional state, creat-
ing a nation state, and being heavily armed, then the Japanese government got into the London
financial market without being politically threatened. Whether exploiting or being exploited by
the London market was a critical junction to the first rising non-Western country.
I. Formation and development of early modern fiscal state:
1192-1867
A. From an ancient empire to a feudalist country
Since the late 6th century, ruling family in the Kinki region,1 the ruling family, which was later
called the imperial family, had made efforts to introduce sophisticated political institutions and
technologies from the Chinese empire. In 701, the Taiho Imperial Legal Codes (Taiho Ritsuryo),
a land mark of ancient legal history was promulgated. That legal codes was a modified copy of
the legal codes of the Chinese empire, written in classical Chinese. The Imperial Legal Codes
stipulated very centralized scheme of legal and political system, but the Imperial Government
did not hold sufficient resources to really enforce the scheme. The Imperial Government there-
fore delegated duties to keep orders in segmented domains to the Imperial family, nobles and
large temples, and those delegatees were guaranteed privileges to collect some portion of rents
from the relevant areas. This was an origin of Japanese manorial system.
In many manors, real enforcement power was provided professional worriers, not by the
owners of manor. Those worriers came to be called “samurai”s, which originally meant “ser-
vants.” samurais were delegated duties to keep orders and peace in local communities, and to
collect tax, at the exchange of the privilege to correct some rent for themselves. By the 11th
1The central area of Honshu island, the main island of Japanese islands.
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century, in some regions, especially in Eastern Japan which is far away from Kyoto, the Impe-
rial Capital, samurais formed groups led by noble samurais,2 and had acquired enough power
to rule the areas.
In 1192, a big group of samurais in Eastern Japan finally established their own government,
the Kamakura Shogunate. samurais did not follow the Imperial Legal Codes, but they did
their common law. The court of the Shogunate enforced this Japanese common law. However,
in terms of the fiscal regime, the Kamakura Shogunate was basically a part of the manorial
system at least in the 12th century. The main revenue of the Shogunate was from manors the
Shogunate family held, and income of samurais still depended on rent guaranteed by owners
of manors. A critical feature with the manorial system was in that sovereignty to rule people
and to correct taxes from them was not explicitly distinguished from ownership of land that
allowed the owner to claim residual return, and in that either sovereignty over or ownership
of land was fragmented. Typical case was as follows: The sovereignty over a piece of land
officially belonged to the Emperor, the highest-rank duty to rule the piece of land was delegated
to the Imperial family (Imperial family as private agents) with privilege to collect some rent,
some high-rank duty with privilege to collect rent was delegated to high-class nobles such as the
Fujiwara family,3 middle-rank duty with privilege to collect rent was delegated to middle-class
metropolitan nobles or local nobles, and the low-rank duty to keep orders and to really collect
land taxes from peasants cultivating the piece of land was delegated to local samurais with some
privilege to collect rent at the exchange of their duty. Thus a fragmented stratus of sovereignty
and ownership was built on the same piece of land.4
Samurais were delegated to only the lowest rank of duty, but they had the real power for
enforcement. Since then samurais therefore gradually eluded the manorial system and expanded
their interests. In the 14-15th centuries, Japan entered the period of warfares, when the manorial
system was almost destroyed.
B. Land and tax reform in the 1590s
The period of warfares ended by Nobunaga Oda, the ruling samurai, and his successor, Hideyoshi
Toyotomi. Given the virtually destroyed manorial system, Toyotomi’s government conducted a
drastic land and tax reform in the 1590s. The essential factors of his reform were, 1)he officially
denied the fragmented sovereignty over land, declared that land of whole Japan belonged offi-
cially to him, and delegated one and only one feudal lord he recognized as his subordinate the
duty to rule a certain domain with the authority to collect tax; 2)he determined the standard of
taxation and ordered his feudal lords to commit to certain tax rates to peasants; 3)he guaranteed
the right to occupy and cultivate a piece of land to one and only one registered peasant on the
piece of land.
Now a piece of land had one and only one lord who held authority of taxation and one and
only one holder of the right of cultivation. Provided that feudal lords were forced to commit to
2They were originally sent by the Imperial government as governors or bureaucrats, and then stayed the areas.
3The family led assembling the Imperial Legal Codes in the 8th century.
4Nagahara (1973).
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some explicit taxation policies and were prohibited from discretionarily imposing taxes, each
peasant virtually had the right to acquire residual crop after he paid tax. Toyotomi conducted
the reform to maximize land tax revenue in the long term by protecting the residual claim of
peasants.5
C. Revenue stability of the Tokugawa Japan
When Ieyasu Tokugawa took over the government from the Toyotomi family and established
the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1603, he inherited this scheme of explicitly committed taxation
policy with guaranteed property right of peasantry. Taxation mainly consisted of three kinds of
items. The first one is called “Primary Tax (Hon nengu),” “Small Crops (Ko mono nari),” and
“Charter Fee (Myoga kin)” and other kinds of indirect taxes. “Primary Tax” is land tax officially
denominated by the amount of rice, and considerable portion of that was indeed paid in kind.
The measure of crop and tax was “Koku.” One Koku is 180.39litters, which was thought to be
standard amount for an individual to live a year, so that productivity of a domoain measured by
“Koku” was supposed to also show the amount of human resources that could be mobilized for
warfares. “Small crops” were imposed on other crops than rice. “Charter Fee” were imposed
on privileged merchants mainly in big cities such as Osaka, Edo, renamed to Tokyo after the
Meiji restoration, and Kyoto.
The “Primary Tax” was indeed the main source of revenue in Tokugawa Japan. The Shogu-
nate and feudal lords conducted inspection of rice production in their domains from the 1590s to
the 1600s, and the result was registered at the Tokugawa Shogunate. This registered estimation
of crop was the tax base of “Primary Tax.” By the early 18th century, the taxation policy was
based sharecropping. The Shogunate and feudal lords committed to some tax rate, such as 40
percent or 50 percent, and unless the crop was very bad, the tax rate was imposed on crop of
the year.
In the early 18th century, the Tokugawa Shogunate changed its taxation policy. Under the
new policy, the amount of tax was fixed. The Shogunate inspected crop of each peasant for
the latest several years up to the inspection year, and then determined the tax amount for his
farm, and this fixed amount of tax instead of rate was effective for next several years. Thus,
while peasants took on more risk of bad cropping, they were given more incentive to increase
production, given that all residual after tax deduction belonged to them.
Feudalist Japan was fragmented to small states and domains governed by different feudal
lords, and each lord held taxation autonomy. While it is difficult to show tax revenue of all feu-
dal lords, about the Tokugawa Shogunate, the central government, revenue of “Primary Tax” is
available from 1716 to 1841. After the reform of taxation in the 1710s, tax revenue moderately
increased, which indicated that the new taxation policy gave peasants stronger incentives. This
shows the tax revenue of the Tokugawa Shogunate was fairly stable.
[Figure 1].
5Araki (1986).
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While tax officially amounted to near 35 percent in the period (Figure 1), we should be
careful because this ratio was based on the official expectation of crop. Mainly based on crop
inspections in the 17th century, official expected crop was determined as tax base. This official
expected crop was hardly changed, thus official expected crop of whole the Shogunate domain
was stable, except for minor changes in acreage of the domain. Officially expected crop per
acreage of land seems to have been stable.
However, Hayami and Miyamoto (1988) estimates the country wide crop increased from 31
million kokus in 1700 to 41 million kokus in 1850, and land productivity (crop per cho) also
increased since 1700 (Table 1).
[Table 1].
In the Tokugawa Shogunate Domain, tax rate ratio generally lower than other feudal lords’
domains, and autonomy of villages were stronger, hence peasants had stronger incentives to in-
crease productivity. Thus the increase of crop in the Tokugawa Shogunate Domain in the period
is supposed to have been considerable. As a conservative estimation, we applied the country-
wide increase rate of land productivity to the Shogunate Domain, and estimated real crop in the
18-19th centuries, and then effective tax rate.6 Based on this estimation of crop, effective tax
rate drop below 30 percent in the early 19th century. The Tokugawa Shogunate provided strong
incentives to increase productivity with peasants, but the fruit belonged to peasants themselves,
not to the Shogunate.
This bargaining result favorable to peasants was partly due to the structure of governance
itself. The Shogunate deployed few officials in rural area, and it was a delegated duty of vil-
lages to keep order, and to collect tax. Taxation policy including tax amount imposed on a
village was a kind of contract between the Shoguate and the village. As long as the village paid
the prescribed tax, the village kept its autonomy. This was an efficient way of collecting tax,
and economizing costs of ruling society. However, small number of officials meant that harsh
asymmetric information existed between the village and the Shogunate. Given this asymmetric
information, ex-post renegotiation of taxation policy accompanied large costs. When the crop
was bad, due to natural disaster for instance, the village called for temporal tax cut. Because the
Shogunate wanted to stabilize tax revenue in the long term, and really bad crop was easy to ob-
serve, it basically accepted this kind of tax cut. However, incremental increase of productivity
6Put yt and yt+n as crop in the t th year and (t + n) th year. Then average growth rate r between t th year
and (t + n) th year is shown by r = (yt+n/yt)1/n − 1. From the Table 1, we have average growth rate r in
1720-1730, 1730-1750, 1750-1800, and 1800-1850. “Officially expected crop in the domain” (a) in the Appendix
I can be interpreted as a proxy of acreage rather than real crop. Thus we can estimate crop in the t the year bt by
bt = (1+ r)× (at/at−1)× bt−1. For 1721-1730, 1731-1750, 1751-1800, and 1801-1841, we used r calculated by
the procedure above. Before 1720, we assume that the “Officially expected crop a” was fairly close to real crop,
thus we inserted a1716 to a1720 as b1716 to b1720.
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was hard to observe from the Shogunate side, and any renegotiation for tax increase incurred
huge cost on the Shogunate, which strongly depended on autonomous villages as instruments
of governance. Therefore, while the Shogunate could keep the stable land tax revenue, marginal
increase of agricultural productivity drained from the Shogunate treasury.
Consequently, the Shogunate came to rely more on indirect taxes from merchants in the big
cities in the mid 19th century (Table 2). Increased expenditure for salaries and civil services
forced the Shogunate to find new revenue sources (Table 3).7
[Table 2], [Table 3].
Even though the imbalance between stable land tax and increasing expenditure was a serious
problem to the Shogunate, the Shogunate did not issue neither bonds nor notes.8 The Shogu-
nate allowed other feudal lords to issue bonds and notes that circulated only within their own
territories, but the Shogunate itself never issued. Because the Shogunate exclusively held the
currency sovereignty to issue coins, it could acquire extra revenue by re-coinage to deteriorated
quality coins (Table 2). This was a useful inflation tax to transfer from the private sector to the
government sector, but only temporarily. The Shogunate can be said to had stable tax base, but
not to have had any sustainable institution to finance the government.
II. The Meiji Restoration: 1868-1889
A. Abolition of feudalist system and fiscal centralization
The Tokugawa Shogunate exclusively had held the sovereignty over diplomacy and national
security. However, when Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry of the US Navy arrived with
4 battleships at Uraga of the Edo bay, the Shogunate could not exclude them. Furthermore,
when he came back in the next year with 7 battleships this time, the Shogunate concluded a
treaty of peace and amity under which Japan was obliged to open Shimoda Port in Shizuoka
and Hakodate Port in Hokkaido, to provide the United States with a most-favored-nation treat-
ment, to accept a consul at Shimoda port, and to give the US consular jurisdiction, but the US
was obliged to give Japan neither a most-favored-nation treatment nor consular jurisdiction.
Under the Tokugawa ideology, peasants had obligation to pay tax while the samurais had the
responsibility to national security. Thus a historically shameful treaty with a foreign country
made feudal lords and people sceptical against the Tokugawa Shogunate sovereignty.
In 1858, the Shogunate concluded a treaty of friendship and commerce with the United
States, under which Japan was obliged to open Yokohama, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hyogo as
treaty ports, to accept the free trade mechanism, and to give up tariff autonomy. This sudden
7Oguchi (1976).
8More precisely, there was an exception. In 1867, the Shogunate issued convertible notes at Yokohama, the
treaty port, and Edo, to facilitate foreign exchanges.
6
joining the international market provided Japan with a drastic change of relative prices, where
huge loss belonged to relatively disadvantaged industries, and huge gain to relatively advan-
taged industries. This drastic change meant destroyed was the existing commercial network
which large merchants privileged by the Shogunate had managed. Losing ability to control pol-
itics and economy, the Shogunate lost to the Boshin Civil War with the State of Choshu and the
State of Satsuma, on the side of which the Emperor stood, in 1868.9
In 1871, the New Imperial Government abolished any autonomy of 260 feudal states and
domains, and declared sovereignty all over Japan exclusively belonged to the New Imperial
Government. Feudal lords received government bonds to compensate their financial benefit
from their domains, but they lost any authority against their domains. Now all tax revenue of
the country belonged to the central government.
B. Land tax reform in the 1870s
In Tokugawa Japan, a registered peasant exclusively held the right to cultivate his registered
farm and to take residual after tax payment. However, he could not freely sell his farm, or at
least, the Shogunate court did not enforce any contract of trading registered farm.10 In 1872, the
New Imperial Government officially allowed farm holding peasants to sell and buy their farm.
Then, in 1873, the Land Tax Act was promulgated. The act guaranteed modern property right
of farm to the registered farmer at the exchange of tax payment. Also the act prescribed that
land tax be paid by money, not in kind. Procedure of the tax reform was as follows: First the
prefectural government inspected productivity of a piece of land and calculated average return
from the piece of land; second, the prefectural government determined the principle value from
the calculated return and prescribed the principle value as the “land price”; third, 3 percent of
the “land price” is the designated land tax from the piece of land. Thus the “land price” was
the new tax base, and this “price” was fixed and had no direct relation with real trades in the
market.
Another object in enforcement of the act was to have stable land tax revenue. Because
the New Imperial Government had announced the land tax would be cut before it defeated the
Shogunate in order to gather people’s support, some peasants rose in revolt. Riots were sup-
pressed by the Imperial Army nation-widely deployed, but also the government had to concede:
tax rate of “land price” was reduced to 2.5 percent.
That effort was so effective that land tax revenue increased rapidly in the early 1870s, and
it is thought to have recovered to the level in the Tokugawa period in the mid 1870s (Figure 2).
[Figure 2].
9Even after the Shogun surrendered in 1868, the Shogunate Navy and Northeastern states continued to fight
the Imperial army. The last battle between the Shogunate Navy and the Imperial Army ended in May, 1869, in
Hokkaido.
10Trade of non-farm land was legal, and transfer of the right over non-farm land was enforced by the Shogunate
court.
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However, in 1877, the New Imperial Government faced with the last civil war with ex-
samurais in Kyushu region, which incurred huge costs on the government. The government
issued considerable amount of government notes, and it led to rapid inflation. Since the “land
prices” were fixed, inflation meant tax cut in real term. This real tax reduction stimulated rural
economy.
In 1882, Masayoshi Matsukata took over the chair of Minister of Finance, and started harsh
deflationary policy, where the government repaid the government notes by the budget surplus
(Appendix 3). While the primary object of this deflationary policy was to stabilize prices and
financial system, another important by-product was real increase of land tax. This deflationary
policy gave disastrous damages to rural economy especially in Eastern Japan, partly because it
started occasionally at the same time European economy turned down in 1882. Silk reeling was
the export industry of Eastern Japan, so that the region hit both by the international business
cycle and the fiscal policy.
Therefore, it is not clear whether Matsukata’s deflationary policy increased social welfare
or not,11 but it stabilized the budget of the government anyway. In the 1880s, the governmental
budget strongly depended on the land tax (Figure 2) and its dependence was actually as high as it
was in the mid Tokugawa period (Table 2). In terms of tax base, the New Imperial Government
in the late 19th century relied on the Tokugawa heritage.
C. Government Bonds in the domestic capital market
As an effort to modernize financial system, the government promulgated the National Bank
Act in 1872, which was a copy of American national bank system, so that national banks were
actually joint stock companies that held privilege to issue bank notes as currency. Under this
act, 153 national banks were established. Correspondence network among those national banks
began to integrate fragmented financial markets.
Departing from the Tokugawa shogunate policy for the central government not to issue notes
nor bonds, the New Imperial Government issued government notes and bonds from the very
beginning. Transformation of feudal lords’ revenue to government consul bonds also increased
the amount of circulating government bonds. The bond market therefore emerged in the 1870s.
This was the birth of the capital market in Japan.
Thus infant financial and stock markets were being formed in the 1870s. After he took his
office, Matsukata, the Minister of Finance, was dedicated to also complete modernization of
financial system. Under his leadership, the Yokohama Specie Bank, the state-backed foreign
exchange bank, was established in 1880. Also he chose the British style of central banking as a
better system, so he established the Bank of Japan in 1882 as the central bank that exclusively
issue bank notes. The Bank of Japan began to allow the bank notes to be convert to the silver
11Patrick (1965) points out that Matsukata’s policy balanced the governmental budget by transfer from from
the private sector to the government sector at the expense of growth.
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coins of Japanese yen.12 Since then, the Bank of Japan held the silver standard until October
1897, when it moved to the gold standard.
Provided that the value of currency had become stable and modern financial market was
formed, the government acquired a well-functioning government bonds market. Since the late
1870s, the balance of issued domestic bonds gradually increased (Figure 3). The domestic bond
market had become a sustainable instrument to finance the government.13
[Figure 3].
III. Fiscal state under the constitution: 1890-1914
A. Rivals in the parliament
In 1889, the Constitution of the Empire of Japan was proclaimed. The constitution basically
followed the one of Prussia, and it gave a strong power to the lower house as well as the upper
house consisting of nobles and other characters chosen by the government: The budget of each
year had to be approved by both houses. If the government failed to pass the budget, it had to
enforce the budget of the last year. Following the Prussian constitution, the constitution did not
officially take the parliamentary cabinet system, while the leading drafter of the constitution,
Hirofumi Itoh, thought Japan should move to the parliamentary cabinet system soon or later.
In the early 1890s, the prime minister and other ministers ware appointed independently to the
parliament. On the other hand, the opposition parties kept the majority of the lower house.
The government sought to build a strong military, to stand against the Western powers. On
the other hand, the opposition parties led by the Liberal Party were supported by rich landown-
ers, who cared more of economic development than military. Thus the majority of the lower
house strongly called for large tax cut. However, the opposition parties had also a weak point.
The Clause 67 of the constitution prescribed that items belonging to the imperial sovereignty
in the budget could not be cut by the parliament without approvement by the cabinet. A typi-
cal item belonging to the imperial sovereignty was military expenditure, that took a large part
of the budget in that period. Therefore, unless the cabinet approved, the parliament could not
cut the military expenditure. Given the structure of the constitution, harsh rivalry between the
parliament and the cabinet gave any benefit neither to the cabinet nor to the parliament.
The Sino-Japanese war, whose main issue was the “independence” of Korea against China,
gave a momentum. This was the first war since the Mongolian invasion to Japan in the 13th
century. Facing with a national event, the parliament stop to fight the cabinet, and approved a
large increase of military expenditure.
12In this period Mexican dollar was the key currency in treaty ports of East Asia, so 1 Japanese yen coin
contained the same amount of silver that 1 Mexican dollar did.
13Kamiyama (1995), Hoshi and Kashyap (2001).
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B. Increasing tax with increasing capital formation
After the price index dropped in the mid 1880s, it began to inflate again since the late 1880s.
This was mainly because Japan took the silver standard. From the 1870s to the 1880s, most
European countries decided to accept the gold standard, which led to the decline of the inter-
national silver price. This meant decreasing exchange rate of Japanese yen. Under the silver
standard, the Bank of Japan controlled the domestic financial market to have exchange rate of
Japanese yen fixed on the international silver price. Low exchange rate finally led to inflation of
domestic prices. A serious result of the inflation was decrease of governmental revenue in real
term, given that the “land price” was nominally fixed, hence the land tax was too. The cabinet
desperately sought land tax increase.
On the side of the opposition parties, the Liberal Party, the leading opposition party, dras-
tically changed its stance against the cabinet, after the Sino-Japanese war. Under the effect
of clause 67 of the constitution, the parliament could not increase expenditure for public wel-
fare. Therefore, the party finally approved the land tax increase at the exchange of the cabinet’s
commitment to considerable increase in expenditure for public welfare, especially for social
infrastructure. This strategic change of the Liberal Party resulted in the establishment of the de
facto parliamentary cabinet system, where the majority of the lower house held the cabinet.14
The effect of the structural change in politics was remarkable. The government expenditure
in the Gross National Expenditure steadily increased since the mid 1890s (Figure 4). Not only
the military expenditure, also the governmental non-military capital formation surged in the
late 1890s, showing that the cabinet indeed committed to investment in social infrastructure.
Especially from the late 1890s to the early 1900, the period of Japanese industrial revolution,
the governmental investment in infrastructure had a considerable role (Figure 5).
[Figure 4].[Figure 5].
C. Government Bonds in the international capital market
Except for the very beginning of the New Imperial Government, the government had hesitate
to issue government bonds in the international market, because it considered the risk of being a
dependency on Western powers. The victory in the Sino-Japanese war mitigated this consider-
ation.
In October, 1897, Japan switched from the silver standard to the gold standard. A reason of
the decision was in access to the international financial market. As long as Japanese yen pegged
to silver, issue of bonds in the London market would require some premium to compensate the
downward risk of the silver price. The government indeed resumed issuing government bonds
in the London market in 1898 (Figure 3). Government bonds issue shot up during the Russo-
Japanese war from 1904 to 1905. After the war, the London market had kept its critical role in
14Mitani (1995).
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Japanese fiscal policy. To avoid high interest rate in the domestic market directly, hence to calm
crowding-out effect indirectly, the government actively issued bonds in the London market after
the Russo-Japanese war.15
Moving to the gold standard and joining the international financial market centered at the
London market had important implication both in handling government budget and in sustaining
macroeconomic stability. In Japan as a developing country, governmental investment in infras-
tructure took a critical role. However, even if investment in social infrastructure could increase
productivity in the long term, governmental expenditure and investment themselves stimulated
effective demand in the domestic economy in the short term that led to the current account
deficit. If the Japanese capital market had effectively been integrated in the international mar-
ket, this current account deficit in the short term would not be a serious problem. Expecting
increased productivity, capital inflow would offset the short-term current account deficit, so that
the Bank of Japan, which was responsible for the value of yen against the hard currency, did not
need to trigger a financial panic by a sudden increase of interest rate as an instrument to have
the domestic demand suddenly shrink.16 However, in the early 20th century, no Japanese firm
established its own reputation in the international market, hence it could not be expected for the
private sector to successfully import capital.
By defeating Russia, only the government established its own reputation in the international
financial market. Therefore, if any importer of capital, the government was one and only one.
Issuing the government bonds in the international market was a critical macroeconomic stabi-
lizer for a emerging country.
The government gave a contract the Yokohama Specie Bank, a partly state-owned foreign
exchange bank, to issue bonds. The London branch office of the Yokohama Specie Bank have
British merchant banks endorse the bonds, and then sell the bonds. The gold standard before the
World War I was basically the sterling pound exchange standard, hence reserve of the starling
pound supported trust in the yen. The balance at the London branch of the Yokohama Specie
Bank was then included into reserve of the Bank of Japan. The Bank of Japan considered
not only its own reserve in Japan, also reserve at the London branch of the Yokohama Specie
Bank, when it determined official discount rate.17 As long as the London market expected that
Japanese economy was on a sustainable growth path, Japanese government was financed, which
meant Japanese economy was financed too.
After the Russo-Japanese war, not only the international financial market provided a sus-
tainable channel of fund raising with the government, capital import through the government
bonds had become an important instrument to keep macroeconomic stability of Japan.
For this mechanism to work well, the market had to be efficient, in terms of imposing risk
premium. Otherwise the governmental budget would just lose discipline. Or, the fiscal stability
could be hurt if the market were instable. For instance, the American economy had been at-
tacked by instable international financial market in the 19th century. In that sense, joining the
London market in the early 20th century was a good decision. Exactly at that time, financial
15Kamiyama (1995).
16Net export ([Exports] − [Imports]) must equal to Net capital outflow. Thus net capital inflow offsets net
import.
17Kamiyama (1995).
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market was globally integrated and the London market functioned very well as the center.
Conclusion
The Tokugawa Shogunate guaranteed the right to cultivate and to take residual after tax payment
to registered peasants, and respected autonomy of local communities as long as those commu-
nities took responsibility to tax payment. This institution gave the Shogunate a s table land tax
base. This land tax kept being the main revenue not only to the Tokugawa Shogunate, also to
the New Imperial Government after the Meiji restoration.
After 1890, the constitution admitted the authority to approve budget to the lower house,
while the government was eager to increase tax revenue in order to enhance military ability. The
leading opposition party chose a way where the party approved increased expenditure on the one
hand, the government committed to investment in social infrastructure. Japanese democracy
finished its youth at that point, and the fiscal policy came to have internalize a sustainable
mechanism to invest in infrastructure and to increase tax revenue.
Facing with short of revenue during its centralization process, the New Imperial Government
had issued bonds in the domestic market since the 1870s. Establishment of modern financial
system facilitated it. However, the domestic market was not sufficiently large especially when
the government came to take an important role in building infrastructure. Therefore Japan
moved from the silver standard to the gold standard in 1897, and accessed the international
financial market. The government indeed began to issue bonds in the London market in the
late 1890s, and the balance surged during the Russo-Japanese war from 1904-1905. Now the
government had a stable instrument to finance itself.
The channel to the London market had another implication. In the early 20th century, any
Japanese firm had not established its own reputation in the international capital market. Thus
the government bonds was the route to import capital. This channel enabled the government
and the Bank of Japan to hold growth-oriented fiscal and monetary policy, without considering
short-term current account deficit too much.
While the central government had built a stable tax base in the 17th century, this was finally
equipped with a sustainable financing mechanism when it entered the London market in the late
1890s. At this point, Japanese fiscal state was formed as a sustainable mechanism.
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Year Riced ti
CultivatedPopulation
Table 1  Population and rice production in the
Tokugawa period.
1600 1,200 2,065 19,731
1650 1,718 2,345 23,133
1700 2,769 2,841 30,630
1720 3,128 2,927 32,034
1730 3,208 2,971 32,736
thousands of
chothousands
thansands of
koku
pro uc onacreage
1750 3,110 2,991 34,140
1800 3,065 3,032 37,650
1850 3,228 3,170 41,160
1872 3,311 3,234 46,812
Source :  Hayami and Miyamoto (1988), p. 41.
Table 2  Revenue Structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate thousands of Ryo
1730 1843 1844
646.8509.0Land tax (Nengu, paidffi i ll i ki d f i ) 603.7a
General
Account
Direct tax for state public
works (Kuniyaku, paid in 7.2
23.3
71.3
706 4
22.4
45.9
158 0
24.9
26.9
55.0
29 0
o c a y n n  o  r ce
20.2
Direct tax for small public
works (Kobushin, paid in
Direct tax for special civil
service (Shoyakusho no, paid
Indirect tax (Goyokin, paid by
a /b 79% 71% 44%
112.9
20.8
b
Surplus from selling tax rice
(Kome uri harai dai)
Repayment of lending (Sho
kashitsuke hen no paid in
45.7
208.8
.
1,455.0
32.1
165.7
.
850.2Subtotal
.
644.8
money)
Subtotal
10.4
9.8
153.9c
  ,  
Surplus from recoinage
Other revenues
Total b +c
Special
Account
s
798 7
394.4
43.8
692.7
1 542 9
856.4
66.3
1,120.5
2 575 5
Source : Ohguchi (1976), p. 352.
. , . , .
Table 3  Expenditure Structure of the Tokugawa Shogunate thousands of Ryo
1730 1843 1844
Salaries of public
servants (Kirimai 297.3 405.0 428.3
General Subsidies 12 1 146 5 183 7
68.0
60.4
Civil services (Yakusho) 149.5 337.0 288.8
Public works 68.5 73.0
Expenses of Shogunate
house (Okumuki)
 ,
91.9 89.0
0.0
0.0
5.2
101.0
0.0
66.5
2.0
Account
836.1
57.5
Restoration of the Edo
catsle
other expenditures
. . .
Expenses for Nikko visit
Government lending
Subtotal b
Special
Account
s
Government purchase of
rice 103.5
34.9
138.4
96.8
127.7
224.5
95.0
80.8
175.8
Subtotal a 593.0 1,220.9 1,953.4
Source : Ohguchi (1976), p. 352.
731.4 1,445.4 2,129.2Total a +b
45%6,000,000
Koku
Figure 1  Land tax collection of the Tokugawa Shogunate Domain: 1716-1841.
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Fogire 2 Land tax revenue in total tax revenue of the central government: 1868-1914.
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Figure 3 Amount of central governt issued bonds: 1870-1914.
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Figure 4 Gross National Expenditure and governrnent expenditure: 1885-1914.
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Figure  5  Fixed capital formation by government and private sectors: 1868-1914.
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Appendix 1  Rice production and land tax revenue of the Tokugawa Shogunate
Domain: 1716-1841.
Official
i i
Land Tax
Estimate
(Koku) (Koku) (Koku) (Koku) (Ryo)
a b c c /a b /a
1716 4,088,530 4,088,530 1,389,570 1,074,035 115,176 34% 34%
1717 4,098,371 4,098,371 1,365,060 1,080,090 102,494 33% 33%
Year
est mat on
of crop in
the
domain
Estimated
crop
Official
tax rate
d
effective
tax rate
Officially
calculated
amount Paid in kind
Paid in
money
1718 4,044,570 4,044,570 1,435,542 1,127,181 111,765 35% 35%
1719 4,050,850 4,050,850 1,393,529 1,092,581 109,236 34% 34%
1720 4,057,180 4,057,180 1,395,682 1,098,490 107,949 34% 34%
1721 4,066,500 4,069,249 1,305,650 1,027,061 100,722 32% 32%
1722 4,043,320 4,048,788 1,414,290 1,115,508 108,478 35% 35%
1723 4,112,390 4,120,735 1,303,930 1,050,289 91,534 32% 32%
1724 4,278,370 4,289,949 1,488,360 1,190,997 107,910 35% 35%
1725 4 360 670 4 375 427 1 466 215 1 166 544 108 849 34% 34%, , , , , , , , ,
1726 4,310,100 4,327,609 1,500,691 1,204,965 107,182 35% 35%
1727 4,414,850 4,435,781 1,621,980 1,374,545 110,750 37% 37%
1728 4,409,753 4,433,655 1,465,486 1,181,659 101,501 33% 33%
1729 4,446,688 4,473,812 1,608,354 1,292,703 114,346 36% 36%
1730 4,481,056 4,511,437 1,551,345 1,233,428 115,654 35% 34%
1731 4,530,908 4,569,682 1,365,049 1,080,557 100,769 30% 30%
1732 4,521,401 4,568,146 1,392,391 1,062,635 119,558 31% 30%
1733 4,541,744 4,596,802 1,461,986 1,153,187 113,489 32% 32%
1734 4,541,816 4,604,992 1,343,519 1,061,441 101,655 30% 29%
1735 4,539,331 4,610,600 1,462,706 1,137,432 119,238 32% 32%
1736 4,565,359 4,645,224 1,334,481 1,018,661 115,445 29% 29%
1737 4,567,151 4,655,253 1,670,819 1,314,779 128,643 37% 36%
1738 4,580,554 4,677,159 1,533,133 1,181,529 127,282 33% 33%
1739 4,583,446 4,688,377 1,668,584 1,313,907 127,838 36% 36%
1740 4 581 523 4 694 685 1 492 492 1 153 881 122 431 33% 32%, , , , , , , , ,
1741 4,586,472 4,708,055 1,570,388 1,228,550 123,445 34% 33%
1742 4,614,502 4,745,193 1,419,558 1,140,592 98,989 31% 30%
1743 4,624,664 4,764,040 1,636,409 1,298,149 122,666 35% 34%
1744 4,634,076 4,782,165 1,801,855 1,462,749 123,262 39% 38%
1745 4,628,935 4,785,295 1,676,322 1,335,114 124,001 36% 35%
1746 4,634,065 4,799,057 1,766,214 1,422,876 124,602 38% 37%
1747 4,415,820 4,581,117 1,551,214 1,237,156 117,334 35% 34%
1 48 4 411 241 4 84 448 1 90 491 1 2 0 661 11 02 36% 3 %7 , , ,5 , ,5 , , 7 , 7,7 5
1749 4,397,089 4,577,809 1,673,573 1,354,984 117,411 38% 37%
1750 4,390,109 4,578,613 1,693,726 1,380,425 115,691 39% 37%
1751 4,394,525 4,590,948 1,704,664 1,389,211 115,471 39% 37%
1752 4,409,637 4,614,504 1,715,630 1,398,975 115,947 39% 37%
1753 4,413,541 4,626,378 1,680,002 1,365,578 115,165 38% 36%
1754 4,407,515 4,627,853 1,650,387 1,336,747 114,783 37% 36%
1755 4,412,347 4,640,739 1,642,551 1,336,213 113,371 37% 35%
1756 4,406,064 4,641,946 1,649,384 1,331,264 116,328 37% 36%
1757 4,420,503 4,665,012 1,552,846 1,262,896 105,630 35% 33%
1758 4,426,889 4,679,630 1,649,532 1,332,456 116,202 37% 35%
1759 4,471,712 4,734,983 1,701,560 1,383,755 116,464 38% 36%
1760 4,461,631 4,732,276 1,685,345 1,369,539 115,982 38% 36%
1761 4,465,654 4,744,530 1,680,127 1,359,958 117,523 38% 35%
1762 4,458,083 4,744,474 1,674,699 1,354,852 117,320 38% 35%
1763 4,375,836 4,664,797 1,643,963 1,334,204 113,262 38% 35%
1764 4,376,432 4,673,300 1,636,386 1,324,862 113,954 37% 35%
1765 4,387,292 4,692,797 1,594,040 1,284,248 113,332 36% 34%
1766 4 387 045 4 700 447 1 538 971 1 241 941 108 724 35% 33%, , , , , , , , ,
1767 4,394,756 4,716,649 1,598,767 1,287,527 114,163 36% 34%
1768 4,378,684 4,707,325 1,547,248 1,229,794 116,619 35% 33%
1769 4,378,574 4,715,145 1,594,461 1,275,740 117,153 36% 34%
1770 4,371,923 4,715,922 1,467,010 1,131,973 123,549 34% 31%
1771 4,375,647 4,727,899 1,353,282 1,021,543 123,363 31% 29%
1772 4,375,961 4,736,212 1,525,624 1,193,539 123,281 35% 32%
1773 4,378,819 4,747,297 1,508,026 1,175,311 123,413 34% 32%
1774 4,379,699 4,756,259 1,530,615 1,208,170 119,349 35% 32%
1775 4,387,091 4,772,321 1,520,866 1,199,900 117,750 35% 32%
1776 4,387,201 4,780,489 1,569,988 1,250,265 117,405 36% 33%
1777 4,392,791 4,794,652 1,556,681 1,237,369 116,793 35% 32%
1778 4,372,435 4,780,482 1,517,858 1,190,441 118,462 35% 32%
1779 4,373,996 4,790,253 1,525,452 1,194,575 119,859 35% 32%
1780 4,371,639 4,795,746 1,427,789 1,124,839 108,691 33% 30%
1781 4 348 278 4 778 163 1 465 836 1 147 934 114 663 34% 31%, , , , , , , , ,
1782 4,332,441 4,768,789 1,460,933 1,138,370 116,529 34% 31%
1783 4,350,709 4,796,972 1,219,484 968,418 95,865 28% 25%
1784 4,360,521 4,815,899 1,492,139 1,172,935 116,465 34% 31%
1785 4,330,634 4,790,956 1,403,708 1,093,200 114,412 32% 29%
1786 4,341,213 4,810,759 1,081,485 851,493 83,945 25% 22%
1787 4,361,544 4,841,440 1,444,933 1,164,205 112,291 33% 30%
1788 4,384,334 4,874,945 1,433,377 1,162,389 108,395 33% 29%
1789 4,384,279 4,883,104 1,410,414 1,118,088 107,612 32% 29%
1790 4,380,524 4,887,150 1,442,995 1,159,230 105,731 33% 30%
1791 4,382,813 4,897,950 1,356,289 1,088,669 99,550 31% 28%
1792 4,393,572 4,918,253 1,470,399 1,187,978 105,196 33% 30%
1793 4,393,000 4,925,906 1,476,278 1,199,720 103,481 34% 30%
1794 4,403,622 4,946,144 1,471,301 1,190,091 105,320 33% 30%
1795 4,504,516 5,068,000 1,545,767 1,257,316 107,963 34% 31%
1796 4 507 226 5 079 601 1 559 023 1 269 573 108 164 35% 31%, , , , , , , , ,
1797 4,501,193 5,081,356 1,561,828 1,274,532 107,273 35% 31%
1798 4,504,565 5,093,739 1,544,821 1,256,977 107,609 34% 30%
1799 4,499,020 5,096,048 1,501,108 1,121,107 107,801 33% 29%
1800 4,493,395 5,098,259 1,552,740 1,265,727 107,103 35% 30%
1801 4,474,977 5,081,896 1,558,351 1,273,466 106,658 35% 31%
1802 4,488,636 5,101,959 1,443,666 1,170,456 102,311 32% 28%
1803 4,485,711 5,103,187 1,562,872 1,272,120 107,627 35% 31%
1804 4 48 80 110 099 1 36 203 1 266 228 10 990 34% 30%, 7,7 5, , ,5 , , , 7,
1805 4,487,885 5,114,782 1,546,915 1,277,485 107,771 34% 30%
1806 4,482,740 5,113,480 1,519,075 1,250,456 107,447 34% 30%
1807 4,453,870 5,085,084 1,425,102 1,163,522 107,211 32% 28%
1808 4,459,079 5,095,577 1,391,881 1,151,226 96,261 31% 27%
1809 4,457,080 5,097,840 1,501,989 1,230,897 108,436 34% 29%
1810 4,455,394 5,100,462 1,527,031 1,256,777 99,994 34% 30%
1811 4,478,873 5,131,919 1,532,910 1,241,483 108,476 34% 30%
1812 4,434,556 5,085,677 1,520,969 1,240,486 102,732 34% 30%
1813 4,437,458 5,093,549 1,501,877 1,221,763 103,459 34% 29%
1814 4,442,669 5,104,084 1,535,799 1,249,917 105,053 35% 30%
1815 4,423,929 5,087,092 1,501,023 1,214,791 105,240 34% 30%
1816 4,423,274 5,090,880 1,483,067 1,196,505 105,212 34% 29%
1817 4,412,452 5,082,959 1,518,991 1,231,283 105,629 34% 30%
1818 4,334,570 4,997,701 1,519,374 1,233,374 104,982 35% 30%
1819 4,352,548 5,022,910 1,537,207 1,250,568 105,133 35% 31%
1820 4,333,634 5,005,549 1,490,752 1,205,297 104,672 34% 30%
1821 4,326,489 5,001,758 1,433,694 1,148,678 104,968 33% 29%
1822 4 320 482 4 999 273 1 496 240 1 208 342 105 244 35% 30%, , , , , , , , ,
1823 4,333,886 5,019,261 1,403,384 1,117,660 105,592 32% 28%
1824 4,223,923 4,896,276 1,427,619 1,158,677 98,889 34% 29%
1825 4,223,068 4,899,656 1,317,840 1,065,745 94,194 31% 27%
1826 4,229,389 4,911,371 1,428,537 1,163,502 97,406 34% 29%
1827 4,218,089 4,902,622 1,434,498 1,166,669 98,523 34% 29%
1828 4,194,554 4,879,621 1,339,578 1,077,787 96,223 32% 27%
1829 4,201,033 4,891,522 1,399,289 1,133,201 97,797 33% 29%
1830 4,182,691 4,874,514 1,378,578 1,113,204 97,715 33% 28%
1831 4,201,301 4,900,574 1,429,328 1,162,448 97,980 34% 29%
1832 4,204,038 4,908,145 1,396,390 1,120,504 101,292 33% 28%
1833 4,205,910 4,914,715 1,258,230 1,005,367 96,022 30% 26%
1834 4,202,806 4,915,473 1,427,193 1,150,709 101,648 34% 29%
1835 4,205,570 4,923,097 1,304,313 1,036,653 98,054 31% 26%
1836 4,202,493 4,923,888 1,039,970 807,068 93,161 25% 21%
1837 4 229 581 4 960 051 1 392 915 1 122 234 100 023 33% 28%, , , , , , , , ,
1838 4,194,210 4,922,963 1,305,746 1,046,104 97,412 31% 27%
1839 4,192,637 4,925,510 1,407,218 1,140,499 99,311 34% 29%
1840 4,166,475 4,899,146 1,382,698 1,138,359 97,735 33% 28%
1841 4,167,613 4,904,860 1,434,342 1,168,412 97,737 34% 29%
Source : Official expected crop and land tax: Seisai Mukouyama, "On tori  ka tsuji
kakitsuke (Record of tax collection)," in Seisai Mukouyama, Mukouyama Seisai
Zakki (Memorandum by Seisai Mukouyama), Tempo-Koka Hen, vol. 3, Tokyo:
Note : 1 Koku = 180.39 litters = 5.12 US bushels.
         
Yumani Shobo, 2003.  Estimated crop: See the text.
Appendix 2  Gross National Expenditure: Current prices, 1885-1914. millions of Yen
Personal GeneralG
Gross
Domestic
Exports of
Goods and
Sevices and
Government
Consumption
d Fi d
Imports of
Goods and
S i d Suplus on
Gross
National
a b c d e f g =e −f a +b +c +g (b +d )/g
1885 652 60 97 23 42 45 -3 806 10%
1886 630 63 101 18 55 49 6 800 10%
1887 664 62 100 18 59 67 -8 818 10%
Year
Consumption
Expenditure
overnment
Consumption
Expenditure
Fixed
Capital
Formation
Government
Sector
 
Factor
Income
Received
from Abroad
an  xe
Capital
Formatin in
GNE
erv ces an
Factor
Income Paid
Abroad
Current
Account
Expenditure
at Market
Prices
1888 677 62 133 20 74 80 -6 866 9%
1889 755 59 141 22 78 78 0 955 8%
1890 869 66 153 25 65 97 -32 1,056 9%
1891 903 63 160 34 89 76 13 1,139 9%
1892 888 70 153 30 102 88 14 1,125 9%
1893 970 66 165 29 100 104 -4 1,197 8%
1894 1,009 124 220 51 125 140 -15 1,338 13%
1895 1 160 148 251 49 150 157 7 1 552 13%, - ,
1896 1,308 118 308 62 135 203 -68 1,666 11%
1897 1,545 111 402 112 191 292 -101 1,957 11%
1898 1,808 131 426 125 200 371 -171 2,194 12%
1899 1,776 150 376 134 257 245 12 2,314 12%
1900 1,914 183 391 143 259 333 -74 2,414 14%
1901 1,898 201 379 134 310 304 6 2,484 13%
1902 1,984 202 335 118 332 316 16 2,537 13%
1903 2,103 241 366 124 370 384 -14 2,696 14%
1904 2,259 546 364 128 383 524 -141 3,028 22%
1905 2,278 626 517 152 401 738 -337 3,084 25%
1906 2,312 485 540 147 540 575 -35 3,302 19%
1907 2,787 338 634 204 617 633 -16 3,743 14%
1908 2,884 307 663 254 506 594 -88 3,766 15%
1909 2,880 320 597 229 539 556 -17 3,780 15%
1910 2 967 338 689 244 587 656 -69 3 925 15%, ,
1911 3,295 407 860 298 619 718 -99 4,463 16%
1912 3,657 370 857 294 727 837 -110 4,774 14%
1913 3,920 339 861 293 844 951 -107 5,013 13%
1914 3,595 354 806 285 799 816 -17 4,738 13%
Source : Kazushi Ohkawa, Nbukiyo Takamatsu, and Yuzo Yamamoto, Estimates of long term statitcs of Japan since
1868: 1 National income , Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1974, pp. 178, 184-185.
millions of yen
Consum
er price
Appendix 3  Tax Revenue of Central Government: Current prices,
1885-1914.
CT
a b c d e f b /a
1868 3.157 2.009 0.720 64%
1869 4.399 3.355 0.502 76%
1870 9.323 8.218 0.648 88%
1871 12.852 11.340 1.071 88%
 
index in
rural
Custom
Duty
Income
Tax
orpo-
ration
Tax
Year LiqourTax
ax
Total Land
Tax
1872 21.845 20.051 0.016 1.331 92%
1873 65.014 60.604 0.961 1.685 93%
1874 65.303 59.412 1.683 1.498 91%
1875 59.194 50.345 2.555 1.718 85%
1876 51.730 43.023 1.911 1.988 83%
1877 47.923 39.450 3.050 2.358 82%
1878 51.485 40.454 5.100 2.351 79%
1879 55 579 42 112 6 463 2 691 76% 100. . . .
1880 55.262 42.346 5.511 2.624 77% 114
1881 61.675 43.274 10.646 2.569 70% 126
1882 67.738 43.342 16.329 2.613 64% 118
1883 67.659 43.537 13.490 2.681 64% 99
1884 67.203 43.425 14.068 2.750 65% 95
1885 52.581 43.033 1.053 2.085 82% 95
1886 64.371 43.282 11.743 2.989 67% 87
1887 66.255 42.152 0.527 13.069 4.135 64% 86
1888 64.727 34.650 1.066 17.063 4.615 54% 83
1889 71.294 42.161 1.052 16.439 4.728 59% 87
1890 66.114 40.084 1.092 13.912 4.392 61% 94
1891 64.423 37.457 1.110 14.686 4.539 58% 89
1892 67.167 37.925 1.132 15.812 4.991 56% 91
1893 70.004 38.808 1.238 16.637 5.125 55% 93
1894 71 286 39 291 1 353 16 130 5 755 55% 96. . . . .
1895 74.697 38.692 1.497 17.748 6.785 52% 105
1896 76.387 37.640 1.810 19.476 6.728 49% 113
1897 94.912 37.964 2.095 31.105 8.020 40% 129
1898 97.629 38.440 2.350 32.959 9.092 39% 139
1899 126.034 44.861 4.837 1.520 48.918 15.936 36% 132
1900 133.926 46.717 6.368 2.244 50.293 17.009 35% 147
1901 139.574 46.666 6.836 2.176 58.017 13.630 33% 144
1902 1 1 084 46 0 460 2 26 63 38 1 01 31%5 . .5 5 7. . 7 .7 5.5 150
1903 146.163 46.873 8.247 2.355 52.821 17.378 32% 158
1904 194.362 60.939 14.369 3.753 58.286 23.159 31% 161
1905 251.275 80.473 23.278 7.945 59.099 36.757 32% 168
1906 283.468 84.637 26.348 9.435 71.100 41.853 30% 172
1907 315.983 84.973 27.291 8.345 78.406 50.027 27% 189
1908 322.636 85.418 32.144 8.918 83.590 40.067 26% 182
1909 323.407 85.693 32.800 8.254 91.480 36.423 26% 175
1910 317.285 76.291 31.722 7.527 86.701 39.949 24% 176
1911 329.071 74.936 34.755 9.713 86.032 48.518 23% 189
1912 360.969 75.365 38.933 11.474 93.861 68.496 21% 199
1913 369.479 74.635 35.591 13.068 93.223 73.722 20% 205
1914 343.708 74.925 37.157 13.222 95.781 44.228 22% 190
Source : Tax revenue: Katsuma Ohsato, Hundred-year statistics of the Japanese economy , Tokyo: Statistics
Department, The Bank of Japan, 1966, p.136.   Price index: Kazushi Ohkawa, Miyohei Shinohara, and Mataji
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Appendix 4  Total Expenditures of Government: Current prices, 1868-1914.     millions of Yen
Special
Mili d
Total Government
ExpenditureGeneral Account
a c d e =a +c −d f g =e +f h
1868 30.5 30.5 0.0 30.5 5.6
1869 20.7 20.7 0.0 20.7 4.0
1870 20.1 20.1 0.0 20.1 2.7
1871 19.2 19.2 0.0 19.2 3.8
Year
Transfer Net Total
AccountCentral
Government
Local
Government
tary an
War-related
Expnediture
1872 57.7 57.7 0.0 57.7 10.5
1873 62.6 62.6 0.0 62.6 11.6
1874 82.2 82.2 0.0 82.2 15.9
1875 69.2 69.2 0.0 69.2 12.2
1876 59.3 59.3 22.4 81.7 35.6
1877 48.4 48.4 18.8 67.2 42.4
1878 60.9 60.9 0.4 61.3 25.0
1879 60 3 24 2 2 6 81 9 2 6 84 5 26 4. . . . . . .
1880 63.1 27.7 3.6 87.2 3.6 90.8 27.3
1881 71.4 34.5 1.4 104.5 1.4 105.9 26.8
1882 73.4 38.1 1.3 110.2 1.3 111.5 27.0
1883 81.0 36.8 1.7 116.1 1.7 117.8 33.3
1884 76.6 36.0 1.5 111.1 1.5 112.6 34.9
1885 61.1 30.3 1.9 89.5 1.9 91.4 32.4
1886 83.2 35.7 2.2 116.7 2.2 118.9 34.9
1887 79.4 33.7 1.7 111.4 1.7 113.1 36.4
1888 81.5 35.0 1.8 114.7 1.8 116.5 36.5
1889 79.7 38.3 4.3 113.7 5.2 118.9 37.5
1890 82.1 40.7 3.6 119.2 0.0 119.2 34.1
1891 83.5 42.8 10.5 115.8 0.0 115.8 37.0
1892 76.7 46.1 5.1 117.7 0.0 117.7 36.8
1893 84.5 48.6 11.7 121.4 0.0 121.4 37.3
1894 78 1 50 8 4 6 124 3 91 4 215 7 140 5. . . . . . .
1895 85.3 55.5 4.4 136.4 149.4 285.8 133.8
1896 168.8 67.4 11.5 224.7 -9.8 214.9 93.4
1897 223.6 84.4 10.5 297.5 33.3 330.8 132.4
1898 219.7 92.7 7.8 304.6 96.3 400.9 134.6
1899 254.1 110.0 10.7 353.4 137.8 491.2 139.9
1900 292.7 128.6 9.2 412.1 52.6 464.7 159.9
1901 266.8 150.7 9.1 408.4 38.3 446.7 133.7
1902 289 2 1 3 9 10 8 432 3 2 9 0 2 114 8. 5 . . . 7 . 5 5. .
1903 249.5 158.9 11.0 397.4 111.7 509.1 180.9
1904 277.0 128.4 7.8 397.6 474.8 872.4 726.7
1905 420.7 131.0 8.5 543.2 497.2 1,040.4 843.2
1906 464.2 167.8 12.0 620.0 491.7 1,111.7 514.4
1907 602.4 201.0 17.5 785.9 409.1 1,195.0 358.7
1908 636.3 230.2 16.9 849.6 222.5 1,072.1 344.1
1909 532.8 263.1 16.9 779.0 274.9 1,053.9 319.0
1910 569.1 280.6 12.4 837.3 653.5 1,490.8 332.8
1911 585.3 389.2 14.7 959.8 245.4 1,205.2 350.1
1912 593.5 328.6 11.4 910.7 345.6 1,256.3 342.3
1913 573.6 292.7 12.6 853.7 506.6 1,360.3 335.1
1914 648.4 299.3 14.5 933.2 330.9 1,264.1 345.5
Source : Koichi Emi and Yuichi Shionoya, Estimates of long term statitcs of Japan since 1868: 7
Government Expenditure , Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shimposha, 1966, pp. 168-169, 186-187.
Appendix 5  Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation, 1868-1914. millions of Yen
Total
Non-
C t ti E i t C t ti E i t
Government Private
Year ons ruc o qu pmen ons ruc o qu pmen
a b c d e f g h =a +e
1868 19.320 19.020 14.120 4.900 19.320
1869 34.170 32.510 29.280 3.230 34.170
1870 36.560 35.990 32.410 3.580 36.560
1871 39.440 38.300 33.180 5.120 39.440
1872 54.140 50.730 41.310 9.420 54.140
1873 72.370 71.810 58.720 13.090 72.370
1874 99.660 99.400 80.920 18.530 11.140 11.140 110.800
1875 118.530 76.570 61.990 9.690 26.520 26.520 145.050
1876 107.910 73.830 66.090 12.630 17.890 17.890 125.800
1877 117.500 72.620 57.420 15.200 43.960 0.370 43.590 161.460
1878 107.310 68.870 54.030 14.840 55.400 0.500 54.900 162.710
1879 96.800 80.490 64.240 16.250 65.230 0.530 64.700 162.030
1880 117.920 99.270 74.790 24.480 87.230 0.400 86.830 205.150
1881 118 310 101 920 74 030 27 890 92 040 0 300 91 740 210 350. . . . . . . .
1882 130.290 113.230 87.280 25.950 71.660 0.270 71.390 201.950
1883 167.260 125.750 98.530 27.220 84.190 7.930 76.260 251.450
1884 189.510 124.630 95.920 28.710 83.210 9.940 73.270 272.720
1885 229.900 156.380 121.680 34.700 76.940 8.960 67.980 306.840
1886 174.400 123.660 99.820 23.860 109.630 20.190 89.440 284.030
1887 185.070 132.490 109.050 23.440 264.490 112.480 152.010 449.560
1888 197.250 140.370 116.400 23.970 560.950 251.290 309.660 758.200
1889 222.010 157.390 133.420 23.970 541.120 300.630 240.490 763.130
1890 248.780 177.850 147.730 30.120 586.370 291.890 294.480 835.150
1891 334.660 259.480 217.820 41.660 568.170 217.430 350.740 902.830
1892 301.170 226.480 183.260 43.220 470.340 183.710 286.630 771.510
1893 295.460 227.210 187.630 39.580 650.910 236.910 414.000 946.370
1894 503.890 252.630 211.490 41.140 932.360 321.390 610.970 1,436.250
1895 489.520 256.590 205.820 50.770 1,053.530 392.210 661.320 1,543.050
1896 632 030 411 370 342 960 68 410 1 382 090 482 750 899 340 2 014 120. . . . , . . . , .
1897 1,119.810 590.390 476.430 113.960 1,809.670 804.000 1,005.670 2,929.480
1898 1,247.230 618.460 477.840 140.620 1,810.560 848.060 962.500 3,057.790
1899 1,343.210 700.700 547.020 153.680 1,252.430 736.140 516.290 2,595.640
1900 1,422.320 829.930 638.410 191.520 1,310.830 666.490 644.340 2,733.150
1901 1,338.030 899.710 670.420 229.290 1,271.030 757.950 513.080 2,609.060
1902 1,179.520 871.060 642.010 229.050 976.450 663.590 312.860 2,155.970
1903 1,238.880 908.740 661.540 247.200 1,112.070 748.880 363.190 2,350.950
1904 1 281 140 688 600 4 8 90 230 010 1 316 60 68 80 4 980 2 9 00, . . 5 .5 . , .5 5 .5 7 7. ,5 7.7
1905 1,520.500 747.370 525.220 222.150 1,930.930 672.080 1,258.850 3,451.430
1906 1,476.020 837.200 580.960 256.240 1,940.440 877.890 1,062.550 3,416.460
1907 2,037.140 1,337.930 995.210 342.720 2,199.950 922.120 1,277.830 4,237.090
1908 2,535.940 1,741.420 1,314.050 427.370 2,045.780 944.430 1,101.350 4,581.720
1909 2,295.090 1,642.490 1,211.220 431.270 1,627.760 867.100 760.660 3,922.850
1910 2,436.280 1,800.450 1,337.900 462.550 2,478.750 1,439.050 1,039.700 4,915.030
1911 2,976.390 2,202.700 1,670.900 531.800 3,629.180 2,172.040 1,457.140 6,605.570
1912 2,934.130 2,132.420 1,498.430 633.990 3,500.540 1,451.660 2,048.880 6,434.670
1913 2,928.860 2,119.830 1,482.190 637.650 3,360.240 1,396.180 1,964.050 6,289.100
1914 2,853.300 1,997.140 1,359.530 637.610 2,912.230 1,376.550 1,535.680 5,765.530
Source : Koichi Emi, Estimates of long term statitcs of Japan since 1868: 4 Capital Formation , Tokyo: Toyo
Keizai Shimposha, 1971, pp. 224-227.
Appendix 6  Cnetral Government Debts: Current prices, 1868-1914.    millions of Yen
F i
Long-term Government Securities
Short-term
G t B i T t l
a b c d =a+b+c
1870 48.800 48.800 48.800
1871 48.800 48.800 48.800
1872 280.560 231.760 48.800 280.560
1873 406.400 245.360 161.040 406.400
Domestic
Bonds
ore gn
Currency
Bonds
TotalYear
overnmen
Securities
orrow ngs o a
1874 469.190 313.030 156.160 469.190
1875 558.100 409.160 148.940 558.100
1876 539.270 397.720 141.550 539.270
1877 2,268.540 2,134.550 133.990 113.360 2,381.900
1878 2,373.640 2,247.400 126.240 150.000 2,523.640
1879 2,351.980 2,233.690 118.290 150.000 2,501.980
1880 2,343.380 2,233.250 110.130 150.000 2,493.380
1881 2 311 270 2 209 540 101 730 150 000 2 461 270, . , . . . , .
1882 2,255.110 2,162.020 93.090 150.000 2,405.110
1883 2,176.620 2,087.560 89.060 100.000 2,276.620
1884 2,298.610 2,213.850 84.760 120.000 2,418.610
1885 2,312.550 2,232.400 80.150 153.960 2,466.510
1886 2,299.940 2,224.720 75.220 198.180 2,498.120
1887 2,379.810 2,309.870 69.940 179.750 2,559.560
1888 2,425.470 2,361.170 64.300 145.230 2,570.700
1889 2,500.530 2,442.270 58.260 100.000 2,600.530
1890 2,432.360 2,380.560 51.800 320.000 2,752.360
1891 2,426.260 2,381.370 44.890 320.000 2,746.260
1892 2,458.940 2,421.450 37.490 320.000 2,778.940
1893 2,358.140 2,328.570 29.570 320.000 2,678.140
1894 2,736.280 2,715.180 21.100 525.000 3,261.280
1895 3,417.590 3,405.560 12.030 679.000 4,096.590
1896 3 573 350 3 571 010 2 340 530 000 4 103 350, . , . . . , .
1897 3,992.450 3,992.450 0.000 220.000 4,212.450
1898 3,912.530 3,912.530 0.000 220.000 4,132.530
1899 4,809.670 3,883.370 976.300 252.000 5,061.670
1900 4,864.640 3,888.340 976.300 323.000 5,187.640
1901 5,022.260 4,045.960 976.300 100.000 563.000 5,685.260
1902 5,301.800 4,325.500 976.300 100.000 444.400 5,846.200
1903 5,389.620 4,413.320 976.300 0.000 783.490 6,173.110
1904 9 36 4 0 6 612 310 3 124 160 3 0 000 01 490 10 8 960,7 . 7 , . , . 5 . 7 . ,7 7.
1905 18,703.860 8,999.760 9,704.100 990.000 1,442.000 21,135.860
1906 21,957.070 10,495.460 11,461.610 962.000 351.560 23,270.630
1907 22,543.460 10,886.450 11,657.010 227.000 279.940 23,050.400
1908 22,283.060 10,626.050 11,657.010 370.000 275.050 22,928.110
1909 25,828.040 14,171.290 11,656.750 190.000 494.350 26,512.390
1910 26,503.550 12,031.400 14,472.150 100.000 1,199.860 27,803.410
1911 25,836.650 11,462.160 14,374.490 500.000 1,084.750 27,421.400
1912 25,732.190 11,162.470 14,569.720 350.000 1,424.490 27,506.680
1913 25,841.220 10,546.340 15,294.880 0.000 1,023.920 26,865.140
1914 25,063.710 9,915.310 15,148.400 0.000 1,433.480 26,497.190
Source : Katsuma Ohsato, Hundred-year statistics of the Japanese economy , Tokyo:
Statistics Department, The Bank of Japan, 1966, p.158.
